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Abstract
Background: Following the recognition that morbidity and mortality due to malaria had dramatically increased
in the last three decades, in 2002 the government of Zambia reviewed its efforts to prevent and treat malaria.
Convincing evidence of the failing efficacy of chloroquine resulted in the initiation of a process that eventually led
to the development and implementation of a new national drug policy based on artemisinin-based combination
therapy (ACT).
Methods: All published and unpublished documented evidence dealing with the antimalarial drug policy change
was reviewed. These data were supplemented by the authors' observations of the policy change process. The
information has been structured to capture the timing of events, the challenges encountered, and the resolutions
reached in order to achieve implementation of the new treatment policy.
Results: A decision was made to change national drug policy to artemether-lumefantrine (AL) in the first quarter
of 2002, with a formal announcement made in October 2002. During this period, efforts were undertaken to
identify funding for the procurement of AL and to develop new malaria treatment guidelines, training materials,
and plans for implementation of the policy. In order to avoid a delay in implementation, the policy change decision
required a formal adoption within existing legislation. Starting with donated drug, a phased deployment of AL
began in January 2003 with initial use in seven districts followed by scaling up to 28 districts in the second half of
2003 and then to all 72 districts countrywide in early 2004.
Conclusion: Drug policy changes are not without difficulties and demand a sustained international financing
strategy for them to succeed. The Zambian experience demonstrates the need for a harmonized national
consensus among many stakeholders and a political commitment to ensure that new policies are translated into
practice quickly. To guarantee effective policies requires more effort and recognition that this becomes a health
system and not a drug issue. This case study attempts to document the successful experience of change to ACT
in Zambia and provides a realistic overview of some of the painful experiences and important lessons learnt.
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Over 40 countries in sub-Saharan Africa have recently
revised their national uncomplicated malaria treatment
policies replacing either chloroquine (CQ) or sulphadox-
ine-pyrimethamine (SP) with artemisinin-based combi-
nation therapy (ACT) [1]. These policy changes have been
made in response to growing evidence of the adverse con-
sequences of malaria treatment failures [2-4] and the need
to limit the future spread of drug resistance [5].
Between the late 1970s and the late 1990s, morbidity and
mortality attributable to malaria rose dramatically in
Zambia with incidence rates nearly tripling from 1976 to
1999 (121.5 cases/1,000 persons/year in 1976 vs. 308
cases/1,000 persons/year in 1999) [6]. From 1985 to
2001, the proportion of total inpatient cases attributable
to malaria nearly quadrupled and the case fatality rate for
hospitalized patients with malaria followed a similar pat-
tern [6]. This prompted the Zambian government to
review its malaria treatment policy. This resulted in a bold
step to abandon CQ in favour of artemether-lumefantrine
(AL) in 2002, thus making Zambia the first African coun-
try to adopt AL as a first line treatment policy nationwide.
The decision-making processes and implementation
approach are documented in this paper along with the
challenges facing the policy to practice transition.
Methods
All published and unpublished documentary evidence
surrounding the antimalarial drug policy change were
reviewed and the health system context within which they
were made. These data were supplemented by the authors'
observations of the policy change process (several of the
authors were actively involved and attended many of the
relevant meetings). Information has been structured to
capture the timing of events, the difficulties and hurdles
faced and the resolutions reached to the final implemen-
tation of a new treatment policy.
Case description
Zambian context prior to policy change
Since the late 1970's, there was a significant increase in
malaria-related morbidity and mortality seen at health
facilities nationwide [6]. Direct attribution of causes for
the resurgence of the malaria burden is hard to define, but
it was widely held that the disease transition was a result
of a combination of economic, prevention and treatment
failures. The economic crisis that began in the early seven-
ties led to a re-prioritizing of local government expendi-
ture, resulting in budget cuts in most sectors including
health. The insecticide-spraying programme, which had
been a major component of malaria control during the fif-
ties and sixties, had to re-deploy spray men to other func-
tions or lay them off altogether. The end of the global
malaria eradication campaign and the WHO's recommen-
dation for worldwide cessation of DDT use in 1973 led to
DDT being banned from use in IRS in Zambia. This dealt
a final blow to the public sector malaria control pro-
gramme in Zambia [6]. By the second half of the 1980s,
the health budgets of the private mining companies also
began to face cuts, leading to reductions in spraying cov-
erage rates, and the mines no longer added buffer zones to
their spraying programme and ceased spraying altogether
in 1990. Against a background of a collapsed prevention
programme and declining health sector financing the
human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodefi-
ciency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) epidemic grew rapidly in
Zambia [7]. As with other southern African countries fac-
ing similar collapses in the health sector financing and a
growing health system burden posed by the HIV epi-
demic, the emergence of resistance to CQ in Zambia rep-
resented a public health disaster.
Drug sensitivity evidence from surveillance data
Nineteen studies examined the efficacy of CQ at sentinel
sites across Zambia between 1995 and 2000 using the
World Health Organization (WHO) 14-day efficacy pro-
tocol [8]. In 1995 treatment failure rates (combined early
and late treatment failure) in children under the age of 5
years ranged from 5.4% to 13.6% at 8 sites. By 1999, the
failure rates had risen to between 24.1% and 44.0% across
10 sites [6]. Between 1995 and 1999 day 14 treatment fail-
ure rates with SP, the second line drug for uncomplicated
malaria at the time, were low (0–4.2%). Two studies eval-
uating the efficacy of CQ were undertaken between 1999
and 2002 at six sites documented day 14 treatment failure
rates were between 25.9% and 52.0% [9]. Corresponding
day 14 treatment failure rates for SP during this period
were between 3% and 7%. After the studies in 2002, a
decision was made, based on ethical reasons, to halt fur-
ther efficacy testing of CQ.
The policy change process
In recognition of the complexity of changing first-line
therapy for malaria, a multidisciplinary Drug Technical
Advisory Group (DTAG), a sub-group of the National
Case Management Working Group with representation
from the pharmaceutical, medical, research, policy and
District Health Management Teams (DHMT) was estab-
lished in the first quarter of 2002 (Figure 1). In addition,
multiple external technical missions to the programme
conducted by partners such as the WHO RBM programme
and the United States Agency for International Develop-
ment (USAID) provided technical support to the DTAG.
The DTAG had two major tasks: a) developing the techni-
cal framework for treatment policy change; and b) design-
ing an advocacy strategy for the new treatment policy
including resource mobilization (financing for the policy
change and funds for procurement of the antimalarials,
among others). The DTAG provided feedback andPage 2 of 7
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ter of Health. In addition to improving the malaria con-
trol programme, this policy change process was expected
to strengthen the performance of other key health sector
support functions such as procurement and supply, drug
regulation, communications and health management
information systems.
In April 2002, the DTAG reviewed the scientific evidence
for policy change [10]. The evidence included the rising
morbidity and mortality statistics, the CQ and SP drug
efficacy studies and research evidence from neighbouring
countries, notably in South Africa [11]. At this point in
time, there had been no clinical efficacy studies of possi-
ble ACT replacements undertaken in Zambia as the only
drugs that had been studied in Zambia up until then were
CQ and SP. CQ resistance was approximately 60% (20–
80% depending on site), well beyond the WHO's recom-
mendations for changing national malaria drug policy.
The DTAG concluded that immediate action was required
to replace CQ as first line therapy and increase access to
curative services and strengthening the health system's
ability to deliver appropriate care. As such the policy
addressed issues related to laboratory diagnosis, logistics
and supply chain management, and behavioral change
and communication.
The DTAG considered several factors regarding the
replacement options to CQ, including the expected pace
of resistance emergence, tolerability, safety, and procure-
ment costs. Monotherapy options were considered. For
example, SP was considered an easy option because it was
already in use as the second line antimalarial and could be
administered as a single dose treatment with a relatively
high safety profile in all age groups. However, the DTAG
were persuaded that SP was not a long-term option
because parasitological resistance was already appearing
in parts of Zambia [9,12] and the arguments for com-
bined therapy were important to the DTAG in an effort to
delay the future emergence of resistance. At the time of the
policy change, SP resistance was low [12] but due to the
fact that this drug was the treatment of choice for children
weighing less than 10 kg and pregnant women, the DTAG
decided to preserve the use of the drug. Additionally, SP is
not truly combination therapy and hence it was not a
good choice for the replacement of CQ. Amodiaquine was
not considered as a serious contender as a replacement
therapy, either as a monotherapy option or in combina-
tion with artesunate, because of its structural similarity to
CQ and the potential for cross-resistance. Halofantrine
and mefloquine were considered but due to safety con-
cerns [13], given the likelihood of substantial unsuper-
vised use, these drugs were not selected. Quinine was
reserved for the management of severe malaria and treat-
ment of malaria in pregnancy. By a simple process of elim-
ination from the limited available options, in March 2002
the DTAG recommended AL for the treatment of uncom-
plicated falciparum malaria [14]. AL was the only fixed
dose combination available at the time, had proven ther-
apeutic efficacy even against multi-drug resistant parasites
[15-17], and was also considered to have the least poten-
tial of developing drug resistance [18]. The fact that AL
additionally had a comparative price advantage, offered
through the differential pricing agreement between WHO
Timeline of the malaria drug policy change process in ZambiaF gure 1
Timeline of the malaria drug policy change process in Zambia.
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more appealing.
Nevertheless, there remained several concerns about the
adoption of ACT for Zambia. Members of the DTAG were
cautious about the introduction of a new drug with lim-
ited published data on its safety profile. Four further con-
cerns were raised by the DTAG: First, AL was at the time
not recommended for use in pregnant women or children
weighing less than 10 kg, two of the most vulnerable
groups. Second, AL had a complex dosing schedule which
included the need for a fatty meal to enhance absorption
of the lumefantrine component. Third, AL had a short
shelf life of 24 months. Finally, AL, despite the preferen-
tial pricing, still cost 40 times more than CQ.
It was estimated that the cost of supplying AL to cover all
malaria cases in Zambia in 2002 would have exceeded the
finances available for the overall Basic Healthcare Package
for the entire country. Additionally, the Ministry of Health
was struggling at the same time with the conflicting prior-
ity need to launch an antiretroviral therapy programme
in-line with the WHO's 3 × 5 strategy [19]. Concerns were
also raised about the sustainability of AL supply from a
single supplier who might not scale-up production to
meet the increased demand.
Despite these legitimate concerns regarding lack of previ-
ous experience with AL, financing and sustainability,
alternative options were few and a definitive decision was
urgently required. In October 2002, AL was officially
adopted as the future first-line therapy for Zambia, a deci-
sion that received a strong political commitment from the
Minister for Health.
Policy change preparatory phase
From October to December 2002, the DTAG, with regular
support from the Minister of Health, agreed to implement
the policy decision in the most expedient manner and
decided upon a phased implementation plan leading to
complete national coverage. The plan [14] proposed that
seven early implementation districts would be the first
recipients of AL and training in its use allowing lessons
learnt to adapt the implementation strategy in the second
phase involving 28 districts and final expansion in the
third phase to the remaining 44 districts across Zambia.
This ensured that once a decision had been announced
action was taken, albeit in a pilot phase and allowing time
for the assembly of necessary financing. At this stage, the
functions of the DTAG were redefined and included two
essential components: a) a case management advisory
group (guidelines, training, job aids); and b) a drug tran-
sition team (procurement, forecasting, distribution, train-
ing, supervising implementation, and outcomes
monitoring).
In order to fast track the policy implementation process
and avoid a potentially protracted formal debate and
approval process within the Zambian Parliament, and
since malaria control was considered a statutory activity,
it was agreed that the policy change should be reconciled
within the National Health Services Act of 1995 [20]. An
Information Cabinet Memorandum was prepared in
order to notify the Cabinet, as per government procedure.
Further regulatory changes were required to re-register
Coartem® (AL) from the 4-dose regimen in the private sec-
tor to a 6-dose regimen, the WHO recommended regi-
men, for public sector use. A waiver was obtained through
the provision in the National Pharmaceutical Act allowing
for extension of a drug label. The Zambia National For-
mulary Committee was approached by the DTAG to
endorse the use of AL and its inclusion in the Zambia
National Formulary and Essential Drug List with the sta-
tus of a first-line antimalarial drug. As a condition of this
process, the Poisons and Pharmacy Board recommended
the design of a strategy for monitoring the safety of ACTs
through post-marketing surveillance, as these were rela-
tively new drugs. The Pharmaceutical Association of Zam-
bia in collaboration with the Poisons and Pharmacy
Board were tasked to mobilize technical and financial
support for this programme.
Although the introduction of health reforms in Zambia
led to the decentralization of Primary Health Services in
Zambia, making malaria control an integral component
of the Primary Health Care package, the program also
benefited from increased investments of up to $20 per
capita. However, the disadvantage was that the cost of
deployment of certain drugs such as AL was well beyond
the budget for the package. This led to high levels of dis-
comfort amongst the donors with fear of introducing a
vertical program but nonetheless a simultaneous height-
ened determination for resource mobilization.
Following the necessary legislative and regulatory approv-
als and revisions, the immediate challenge for the DTAG
was to find external financial support to complete imple-
mentation of the policy. The call for proposals in January
2002 for Round 1 of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) represented a unique
opportunity to secure the necessary funding to effect pol-
icy change. All elements, including a forecasted drug need,
necessary to implement the drug policy change were
assembled into a proposal to the GFATM. The Zambian
Government submitted a four year proposal requesting 36
million US$ for malaria control from the GFATM, of
which, in the first year 4 million US$ were committed for
the procurement of AL and 400,000 US$ to support
implementation of the new policy mostly through
strengthening of laboratory malaria diagnostic capacitiesPage 4 of 7
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round GFATM submissions for malaria control in Africa
[21]. The GFATM decision was made in April 2003 and
the funds were released to the Zambian Government in
August 2003 (Figure 1).
Since the Novartis Pharma AG AL product was the only
pre-qualified form of AL available at the time, a waiver
had to be obtained from the Nation Tender Board to
allow for single sourcing. The first order was placed and
procured through the special WHO-Novartis public sector
supply mechanism and the shipment arrived at the Medi-
cal Stores Limited in Lusaka, the Government's medical
supply agency in September 2003 (Figure 1). The distribu-
tion, based upon monthly estimated demand by district,
began in October 2003 and districts were expected to
request additional stock in concert with consumption
from the Medical Stores Limited. In February 2003, before
the arrival of GFATM funded drugs, the non-governmen-
tal organization, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF),
donated 800,000 AL tablets to assist with the early imple-
mentation, Phase 1, seven districts. Phase 2 involved the
deployment of AL to an additional 28 districts between
July and December 2003. Funds to ensure the implemen-
tation of Phase 2 were made available from the flexible,
government-driven, Heavily Indebted Poverty Countries
(HIPC) resources and the GFATM funds. Subsequently,
nationwide deployment (Phase 3) took place in the first
quarter of 2004 funded largely by the funds provided by
the GFATM.
The private sector played a cardinal role as 20%–30% of
sick patients seek treatment from private practitioners in
Zambia. In addition, local manufacturers were involved
in the packaging and distribution of chloroquine. A pri-
vate sector access strategy was therefore developed and
funds to implement the plan were mobilized in the
GFATM Round 4.
Policy change implementation phase
Two principal guidelines addressing malaria case manage-
ment were used in Zambia prior to the malaria drug policy
change: the Integrated Technical Guidelines (ITG) for
front-line health workers [22] and the Integrated Manage-
ment of Childhood Illness (IMCI) guidelines [23,24].
Through technical consultation between January and May
2003, a final draft of malaria-specific NMCC guideline,
titled "Guidelines for the Diagnosis and Treatment of Malaria
in Zambia", was developed to reflect the new treatment
policy for uncomplicated malaria [25]. The IMCI guide-
lines were revised to incorporate the new drug policy and
were inserted as a change into the IMCI algorithms. The
ITG guideline was updated by the inclusion of an adden-
dum in February 2003. An additional job aide was devel-
oped, with support from Novartis Pharma AG, in the form
of AL treatment dosage wall charts and was distributed to
the districts alongside the drug supply.
A process of cascade in-service training was initiated to
introduce the final draft of the National Malaria treatment
guidelines, which began with three sub-national training
of trainers (TOT) trainings, each including key members
of the District Health Management System Teams
(DHMT). Following the sub-national training between
June and July 2003, district-level training was proposed at
the convenience and funding arrangements of respective
DHMTs. Trainings at the district-level occurred between
November 2003 and February 2004 (Figure 1). The train-
ing involved an initial orientation programme for manag-
ers, followed by a programme for referral facilities, and
then two-day workshops for front-line health. The train-
ing and orientation of district health workers was synchro-
nized with the phased AL deployment. During the
training, participants were provided with individual and
institutional copies of the National Malaria Treatment
Guidelines [26,27,27].
A detailed information, education, and communication
(IEC) strategy was developed, which included a series of
TV and radio programs highlighting the policy change.
Job aids, dosage charts and posters were developed and
distributed to all the health facilities in the countries. The
challenge was to ensure consistency in the messages par-
ticularly during the pilot phase.
Discussion and evaluation
As part of an integrated approach for malaria control and
prevention, Zambia took a bold step in 2002 and intro-
duced ACT as part of its malaria case-management strat-
egy in an effort to reverse the rising malaria mortality and
morbidity. At this time, there was almost no experience of
moving to an ACT first-line anti-malarial drug policy in
Africa, with the exception of Kwa-Zulu Natal Province in
South Africa [11]. The decision-making process, using
data based essentially only on failure rates of currently
used antimalarial drugs, was comparatively rapid, taking
approximately 3 months (Figure 1). In Kenya, Uganda
and Tanzania the decision to abandon CQ in favor of an
equally cheap and widely used drug (SP) took several
years in the late 1990's and early 2000 [28-30]. More
recently in Kenya, the decision to replace failing SP with
AL was quicker than the time taken to decide to replace
CQ with SP, but more protracted than the decision-mak-
ing process in Zambia [31]. The strong political commit-
ment to an effective drug policy change in Zambia,
notably through a direct involvement of the Minister for
Health, was instrumental in arriving at an early decision
in Zambia.Page 5 of 7
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implementation during the first quarter of 2003 was a
remarkable achievement considering the 32 month delay
to implementation in Kenya [31] and similar delays else-
where in Africa. Several factors contributed to this rapid
implementation, not least was the fortuitous timing of the
GFATM funding opportunity linked to the preferential
pricing arrangements for AL between the WHO and
Novartis Pharma AG. The ability of the Zambian govern-
ment to assemble a funding plan in time for the GFATM
application was strengthened by the nature of consensus
and political backing among all the Zambian stakehold-
ers. National partners, such as MSF, were committed in
2003 to assisting Zambia's move to ACT and seed govern-
ment funding through the HIPC arrangements provided
some financial security to begin the process of implemen-
tation.
The preparation required to implement a new drug policy
is non-trivial and here we have highlighted the legislative,
regulatory and guideline revisions required in order to
introduce a new antimalarial into clinical practice. These
steps in policy change are often under-estimated and
require considerable person-hours of discussion by
under-staffed national malaria control programmes.
Unlike the reluctance to implement the AL drug policy
change documented in other countries from different
stakeholders [31], the Zambian regulatory and pharma-
ceutical bodies were in broad agreement with the DTAG's
decisions that created the enabling environment necessary
to implement the policy change. The continued role of the
DTAG from the policy decision-making through to imple-
mentation allowed for a central core throughout the
whole process. The DTAG included broad representation
of key stakeholders and formed a basis for a more consult-
ative and transparent dialogue that was open to external
validation.
Not all countries have adopted a phased approach to pub-
lic sector introduction of AL. In Zambia, the decision to
expand coverage of districts in a three-step process was not
without criticism: why should district X receive AL and not
district Y? However, the speed with which the implemen-
tation plan transitioned from Phase 1 to Phase 3 circum-
vented much of the criticism. Such a strategy also allowed
the programme to build experience before national cover-
age, and it demonstrated that the government was com-
mitted to implementing a decision shortly thereafter to
maintain confidence and credibility in the policy
announcement.
Notwithstanding the comparative success of policy deci-
sion making and preparation for implementation, the
rolling out of the AL drug policy change faced a number
of problems. The most significant was the demand quan-
tification, stock flow and subsequent AL ordering proce-
dures that resulted in stock-outs at peripheral health
facilities [32,33]. A particular problem for AL drug man-
agement is reconciling needs for four patient groups cor-
responding to four different AL pack sizes. The removal
and storage of CQ also posed a challenge, although it was
rarely used at the clinic level after the policy change had
been announced [32]. Patients seemed more ready to
accept the new treatment [34] than the health workers
[32]. This is because patients experienced the rapid clear-
ance of symptoms by the new drug while, on the part of
the health workers, this drug required that they spend
more time counseling the patient on how to take the
doses at home.
Supply chain management for the dose specific packaging
(including consumption data reporting, forecasting and
storage space), expanding coverage to community levels,
including the private sector in AL dispensing, assembling
effective information on pharmacovigilance and ensuring
better quality diagnostics and clinical management
remain implementation challenges for the programme in
Zambia. The AL policy change was implemented against a
background of a health sector human resource crisis.
Addressing the broader health system issues is critical for
a successful malaria case-management strategy.
In conclusion, the transition to effective malaria case-
management strategies including efficacious ACT is a fun-
damental cornerstone for malaria control. These policy
changes are not without difficulties and demand a sus-
tained international financing strategy for them to suc-
ceed. The Zambian experience demonstrates the need for
a harmonized national consensus among many stake-
holders and a political commitment to ensure that new
policies are translated into practice quickly. To guarantee
effective policies become effective practice requires more
effort and recognition that this becomes a health system
and not a drug issue.
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